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NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL MONTEREY, CALIFORNIA



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THESIS

ANALYSIS OF THE TRANSFORMATION PROCESS OF GENERAL DETAIL SAILORS

by

Thomas G. Roulston

September 1998

Thesis Co-Advisors:

Alice Crawford
Lee Edwards

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**ANALYSIS OF THE TRANSFORMATION PROCESS OF GENERAL DETAIL
SAILORS**

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Lieutenant, United States Navy
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Submitted in partial fulfillment
of the requirements for the degree of

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from the

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ABSTRACT

This thesis investigates the possibility of a training gap between course content at the Navy Recruit Training Command (RTC) and the needs of the fleet. The focus is on the internal and external environments that may drive training decisions and curriculum changes at RTC. General Detail (GENDET) seamen with less than two years of service were studied to reflect the direct effects of RTC's mission and to determine RTC effectiveness in transforming civilians to sailors and meeting fleet needs. This study found that RTC appears to function in a political/reactive configuration, which may drive many of the curriculum changes. RTC's curriculum is designed as a military socialization process as part of the transformation process into the Navy. RTC does not, however, appear to instill work ethic, pride in self and the Navy institution, or respect for authority. The fleet desires sailors with the aforementioned attributes. Additionally, a comparative analysis was conducted between the current RTC curriculum and the Navy Enlisted Occupational Classification System (NEOCS). NEOCS determines Naval Standards for knowledge, skills, and abilities based on each pay grade and rating. It was found that RTC should review NEOCS to incorporate more hands-on training, all recruits should be put in leadership roles while at RTC, Recruit Division Commander (RDC) training time is not standardized, and RTC should review the RDC Excellence Award program.

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I. INTRODUCTION

A. BACKGROUND

Many Navy leaders—from E-7 to O-9—have complained openly in the *Navy Times*, *Proceedings*, and other Navy periodicals that today's young sailor lacks discipline and military bearing. Some primary complaints are that young sailors today do not believe in the Navy's core values, lack a strong work ethic, lack pride in ownership and self, and have little respect for authority. Some leaders, who have complained, blame society as a whole for the lack of these values, while others believe recruit training is responsible.

The mission statement of Navy Recruit Training Command (RTC) is, "Transform civilians into motivated and disciplined sailors, prepare recruits for follow-on specialized training, and to prepare recruits for service in the fleet." (RTC Brief to Defense Secretary Cohen, September, 1997) RTC supports fleet readiness by "instilling Navy core values, warrior ethos and impeccable military bearing." (RTC Brief to Defense Secretary Cohen, September, 1997)

B. PURPOSE OF THE STUDY

The purpose of the study is to analyze key factors of the RTC training process in meeting the needs of the fleet for a General Detail (GENDET) sailor. (See Figure 1) Figure 1 is presented as a conceptual model. The model provides a point of reference for achieving the purpose of the study and is explained in detail in the section Scope and Methodology.

This study focuses on the perceptions and experiences of fleet leaders and GENDET seamen with respect to RTC meeting the needs of the fleet in its training curriculum, and RTC curriculum content with respect to the Navy Enlisted Occupational Classification System (NEOCS).

C. SCOPE AND METHODOLOGY

GENDET seamen are used as the study baseline for analyzing RTC training effectiveness. To investigate a possible training gap between training at RTC and fleet needs, GENDET seamen with less than two years of service are studied to determine RTC effectiveness in transforming civilians to sailors and in meeting fleet needs. GENDETs were chosen because, compared to all other sailors, they receive the least amount of training—two weeks of apprenticeship training—before being detailed to various ships in the fleet. These sailors work in Deck Division and are known as “deck seamen.” As deck seamen, their primary functions are to conduct preventative maintenance, line handling, damage control, and stand various watches. Their behaviors and attitudes should provide the most direct indication of preparation for the fleet that sailors receive at RTC.

Figure 1 identifies complex factors that may lead to possible training difficulties. Figure 1 begins with societal factors in the recruiting base for the military. Once individuals from society are accessed into the military, they are sent to a service-designed boot camp, in this case the Navy. The factors involved that determine training content are shown under “RTC.” After graduation from RTC, GENDETs attend Apprenticeship




Figure 1. Conceptual Graphic of Thesis

Training Division (ATD) for two weeks of training and are then detailed to the fleet. Some factors regarding fleet needs are listed. This simple design coupled with its complex factors—from recruiting to entry into the fleet— may cause possible training gaps for the GENDET sailor.

The methodology used for this research was direct observation of the RTC training process and formal interviews with four groups at RTC: (1) recruits; (2) Recruit Division Commanders (RDCs); (3) RTC classroom instructors; and (4) RTC staff personnel. Fleet interviews were conducted aboard three ships, the USS Fitzgerald (DDG-62), USS Chancellorsville (CG-62), and USS Juneau (LPD-10). Fleet interviews were conducted with three groups onboard each ship: (1) First Lieutenant Division Officers; (2) Deck Chief Petty Officers and (3) Deck Seamen (GENDET). The interviews are designed to gain insight to perceived attitudes from recruits, RDCs, and RTC staff personnel on training issues. Fleet interviews are to gain perceived attitudes toward RTC training and fleet needs.

Additionally, RTC's mission statement and training methodologies are compared to the naval standard knowledge and skills requirements listed in NEOCS for enlisted pay grade E-2. The NEOCS is a segment of the Manual of Navy Enlisted Manpower and Personnel Classifications and Occupational Standards (NAVPERS 18068E). NEOCS is compared to RTC's curriculum because it contains the Naval Standards required for each pay grade and is the basis for implementing and supporting actions for recruit training. Naval Standards are the knowledge, skills, and abilities required for accomplishing tasks, duties and responsibilities

in that pay grade. The NEOCS is also used to compare the perceived needs of the fleet based on the required Naval Standards for pay grade E-2.

D. BENEFIT OF THE STUDY

The study will benefit RTC and the fleet. RTC will benefit by having a better understanding of fleet needs through fleet leaders' perceptions of GENDET output, and RTC may better utilize their training time to enhance training based on the standard naval requirements for pay grade E-2. Fleet leaders will benefit by enhanced readiness if RTC is able to enhance its curriculum based on recommendations of this study. Fleet leaders will benefit from having a broader understanding of the external influences on RTC and the environment in which training is conducted.

E. ORGANIZATION OF THE THESIS

Chapter II is a literature review. Chapter III describes the data collection methods used in this study. The results of the interviews and observations are examined in Chapter IV. In this chapter, main themes are developed from the attitudes and opinions expressed by recruits, RDCs, RTC staff, fleet leaders, and GENDETs. Excerpts of the interviews are presented to support these themes. Additionally, a comparative analysis is conducted between current RTC curriculum and NEOCS. Chapter V presents a summary of the study, conclusions, and recommendations for RTC, and recommendations for further research.

II. LITERATURE REVIEW

A. OVERVIEW

The literature review explores areas of concern that may lead to deficiencies in recruit training at Recruit Training Command (RTC), and perceived problems with today's young sailor in the fleet. A review of the civil-military gap may give insight to those being recruited or why there are shortfalls in recruiting. The widening civil-military gap may play a role in RTC curriculum changes. Recruiting shortfalls may be related to the civil-military gap, which may lead to changes in RTC's training methodologies. Recruit Training Command is central to this study and its curriculum changes may be related to changing civil-military relations. Organizational configurations are discussed to understand the internal and external influences on RTC's curriculum. Lastly, the Navy Enlisted Occupational Classification System (NEOCS) is discussed to provide insight to training requirements for recruit training.

B. THE CIVIL-MILITARY GAP

A civil-military gap is evident in some congressional policy-decisions concerning military affairs. (Waldman, 1996). These decisions have lead to Navy recruiting shortfalls, which have, in effect, determined how Recruit Training Command (RTC) conducts training for recruits in preparation for the fleet. (Green, 1997)

The civil-military gap in today's government may be a result of a lack of military knowledge among civilian decision makers. Amy Waldman (November, 1996), a *Washington Monthly* reporter, states, "civilian leaders not serving isn't just morally

problematic; it's pragmatically so." Waldman also says, "... to command the military, a civilian must have the military's respect. To earn the military's respect, the civilian must understand military culture. Fewer and fewer civilian leaders do."

Harvard political scientist Michael Desch concluded in a recent assessment of post-Cold War decision-making in the United States that civilians are now apparently less able "to get the military to do what they want them to do" than they were during the Cold War (Ricks, 1997). According to the *Washington Monthly* (November 1996), close to 60 percent of the men in the Senate are veterans and only 36 percent of those in the House are veterans. Only 20 percent of the Senate-confirmed Clinton appointees are veterans, and only four percent of the White House staff. Ricks (1997) feels that Charlie Moskos is pointing in the right direction when he says that American political and economic elites generally don't understand the military (Ricks, 1997). Further, James Burk, a professor of sociology, Texas A&M University, explains that American people will not tolerate casualties when they dislike a policy or do not understand it, as was true for Somalia. (Ricks, 1997)

Other actions that have widened the civil-military gap are how the current Administration, according to Ricks (1997), bungled the Somalia mission, invaded Haiti, and enforced a peace agreement in Bosnia. All these military movements were made without military background in the senior post of the National Security Council. This misunderstanding of the military is dangerous for both the military and the civilian population. Mutual distrust between the nation's political elites and military leaders could

ultimately undercut U.S. foreign policy, making it more difficult to use force effectively (Ricks, 1997).

Retired Admiral Stanley Arthur, who commanded U.S. naval forces in the Gulf War explains, "Today, the armed forces are no longer representative of the people they serve. More and more, enlisted men and women as well as officers are beginning to feel that they are special, better than the society they serve. This is not healthy in an armed force serving a democracy" (Ricks, 1997:69). According to Ricks (1997), this is the beginning of several trends underway in civilian society and the post-Cold War military that widen the social-military gap creating an isolated and alienated military.

Former chief historian of the Air Force, Richard H. Kohn, argues that officers have changed since the Cold War in the way they act and feel: "I sense an ethos that is different. They talk about themselves as 'we,' separate from society. They see themselves as different, morally and culturally." (Ricks, 1997:70). Andrew Bacevich, a retired Army colonel, who is executive director of the Foreign Policy Institute at Johns Hopkins University's School of Advanced International Studies, suggests, "There is a deep-seated suspicion in the U.S. military of society that is part of the Vietnam hangover—'You guys betrayed us once, and you could do it again.'" This suspicion, he added, "isn't going away, it's being transmitted to a new generation of officers" (Ricks, 1997:73).

According to Ricks (1997), there has been widespread agreement over the past few decades that American society has become more fragmented, more individualistic, and less disciplined, with institutions such as the church, family, and school wielding less influence

on shaping our youth's value system. The changed values put society at odds with the classic military values of sacrifice, unity, self-discipline, and the interests of the group before the individual.

Ricks (1997) followed a Marine platoon through basic training and concluded that the recruits were experiencing, in a very special way, the widening gap between today's military and civilian America. The re-entry shock upon leaving recruit training appears to be greater now than it was in the past. Retired Marine Lieutenant General Bernard Trainor said, "When I got out of bootcamp, in 1946, society was different. It was more disciplined, and most Americans trusted the government. Most males had some military experience. It was an entirely different society—one that thought more about its responsibilities than its rights" (Ricks, 1997:68).

Similarly, United States Marine Corps Sergeant Major James Moore, now retired but at that time the senior sergeant at Parris Island, commented, "It is difficult to go back to a society of 'What's in it for me?' when a Marine has been taught the opposite for so long. When I look at society today, I see a group of young people without direction because of the lack of teaching of moral values at home and in school. We see that when we get them in recruit training. The recruits are smarter today—they run rings around what we were able to do, on average. Their problems are moral problems: lying, cheating, and stealing, and the very fact of being committed" (Ricks, 1997:68).

A related issue is that most Americans only pay attention to the military when they see news of a sexual-abuse scandal or a policy incongruent with societal norms (Princeton

Gallop Poll, May, 1998). This lack of attention toward understanding military roles and missions underscores the separation between civilian society and the military. According to the Princeton Gallup Poll (May 1998), concern about foreign policy, international relations, or war is almost totally missing from the forefront of American concerns. This stands in sharp contrast to many other periods since World War II when foreign policy issues dominated the public's responses to the question of civilian concern for international issues and the military. In the early 1950s, the Korean War was the nation's top problem. The threat of war, nuclear proliferation and communism dominated in mid to late 1950s, and into the 1960s. The Vietnam War moved to the forefront of the public's concerns in 1965, and remained a dominant problem well into the early 1970s. War and peace issues also were highly visible through the mid-Reagan years of the 1980s, and again in 1990 and 1991 at the time of the Gulf War tensions. Today, in an environment in which communism as a threat has essentially evaporated, only four percent of Americans mention international issues or foreign affairs concerns to other Americans in casual conversation (The Gallup Organization, May, 1998).

The military's confidence rating, according to another Princeton Gallup Poll (August 1997), has dropped since last year's 66 percent confidence rating, to a 60 percent rating this year. Perhaps this drop is a result of the lingering effects of the highly visible adultery and sexual harassment charges associated with members of the military over the past year. Although the military remains at the top of the Gallup confidence list, its numbers are down from previous ratings in this decade and are, in fact, at their lowest since 1988 (The Gallup

Organization, August, 1997). The military received its all-time high confidence rating in a poll conducted immediately after the end of the Gulf War in March of 1991, at which time 85 percent of the public expressed high confidence in the nation's armed forces. Confidence in the military generally remained between 64 percent and 69 percent during five 16-month measurement periods since that time.

Eitelberg and Binkin argue that today's youth have grown up in an era marked by apparent U.S. national security failures. Because of the media coverage of these apparent failures, young Americans appear to have less understanding—if not less appreciation—for the military establishment and its role in American society. (Eitelberg and Binkin, 1982).

Dramatic changes have made the military less appealing to today's youth based on their norms, values, mores, and cultural ethos. A comment published in the *Utne Reader*—the *Reader's Digest* of the New Age crowd—captured the disdain for today's military based on the Tailhook and Aberdeen scandals, “it's hard to imagine why any woman—or any man with a conscience—would want to join the military” (Ricks, 1997).

Hence, it may appear that the civil-military gap addresses society's generalized view of the military. If society has a poor attitude toward the military and its governing power—Congress—this may explain recruiting problems, which are discussed below. Recruiting problems, in turn, influence military readiness through low recruiting numbers. If military readiness is being influenced through low recruiting numbers, then RTC may change its curriculum to ensure those recruited remain in the Navy while attending RTC.

C. RECRUITING ISSUES

According to the Chief of Naval Operations (Navy Administrative Message 126/98), the Navy will not meet the required Fiscal Year 98 accession goal of 55,321, which indicates just how difficult a recruiter's job has become. There is negative press about all branches of the service, the United States economy is considered booming, some parents refuse to let their children enlist by calling their Congress persons to intervene, and the Navy requires applicants to have a high school diploma and be drug free. McIntire-Peters (1996) estimated it takes a recruiter an average of 140 to 160 contacts before one new recruit is signed. Because of the entrance requirements and high contact rate, the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) has suggested the need for more recruiters. CNO, Navy Administrative Message 126/98, has allowed qualified E-4 personnel to request recruiter duty to assist in meeting personnel end-strength numbers as required by the Chief of Naval Personnel. In the past, a recruiter had to be in paygrades E-5 to E-8 to be considered for recruiter duty. The CNO stated in his message that "Navy leadership is actively pursuing a broad range of initiatives to increase accessions, getting additional recruiters in the field is the backbone of our effort to establish a steady-state effective recruiting program" (CNO, 1998:2).

According to a *Navy Times* article (May 1998), the Navy is the only service not meeting its recruiting goals. Admiral Barbara McGann, Chief of Naval Recruiting, explains four reasons for the difficulties in recruiting: (1) today's young people don't look at the military as a good way to start their working lives; (2) they are not being influenced by

adults to sign up because fewer adults have a military background; (3) they don't want to commit to a four-year enlistment; and (4) they think education gives them a better chance at larger paychecks later in life than service to their country. According to John Burlage (May 1998), *Navy Times* staff reporter, most of the shortfalls have been with General Detail (GENDET) sailors, but now the emphasis is on the nuclear-qualified sailors. The CNO has ordered more recruiters into the field, but according to Charles Moskos, in an interview with *Navy Times* (May 1998), "The Navy has to recapture some of that old, 'Join the Navy and see the world' mystique. It's traditional and more timely in the 21st century than ever before."

Admiral McGann explains that some of the recruiting problems stem from the Navy not having a clearly defined image that generates enthusiasm for enlistment. Today's message focuses on public service and the Navy's core values of honor, courage, and commitment. Moskos explains that today's youth want the best of both worlds: travel, adventure, and education.

Because of the recruiting shortfalls, Kitfield (1998) explains that it is imperative to recognize the changing face of the military. Ever since the end of the draft in 1973, the services have struggled to attract the bright young adults required to operate in an increasingly high-tech military. With a shrinking manpower pool, the military cannot afford to conduct rites designed to weed out the weak and scare off potential performers. There has been a decrease of young Americans of recruitment age and there is a robust

economy with record employment levels. These factors have made the task of recruiting difficult in recent years and have changed the dynamics of training at RTC.

The shrinking manpower pool and highly selective requirements for recruiting may be a leading factor in the changes that have been made to RTC's curriculum. RTC has had to adopt new training methodologies to keep attrition levels low (Green, 1997).

In today's society, the military service does not appear to be an attractive vehicle in beginning one's life. This attitude makes recruiting qualified personnel difficult. These civilian resources for manning the Navy are in high demand and Navy leadership and recruiters are trying to find a better way to gain these resources. Civilians who have been recruited enhance military readiness. Perhaps curriculum changes have been made at RTC to ensure RTC's vision of supporting fleet readiness.

D. RECRUIT TRAINING COMMAND

The current mission of the RTC is to transform civilians into motivated and disciplined apprentice sailors, prepare recruits for follow-on specialized training, and prepare recruits for service in the fleet. RTC's vision is to support fleet readiness by developing our nation's volunteers into sailors instilled with Navy core values, warrior ethos, and impeccable military bearing. The goal is for recruits to graduate fully capable and eager to meet the challenges of the 21st century Navy. Historically, Zurchery (1967) explains, the role of RTC has been to decivilianize and role-depossess individuals. Depersonalization begins when an individual completes the oath of office at the Military Enlisted Processing Station (MEPS), just before being sent to RTC.

RTC views a new recruit as an individual with a well-developed personality, a civilian frame of reference, and a set of cultural values and expectancies that are not compatible with RTC's mission and organization (Zurchery, 1967). The adjustment problem is for the recruit and comes in the form of reorienting one's behavior from a reference point as a civilian to a military standard. This is not an easy task for RTC and its instructors.

The pressures placed on a recruit during the first week of RTC, according to Goffman (1961), challenge four areas of their lives. These pressures influence their understanding and acceptance of themselves as civilians. This provides a foundation for, and a reinforcement of their concept of self: (1) autonomy of action (self-determination, responsibility for own behavior, feeling relatively free to express themselves and to make choices); (2) personal economy of motion (freedom of spontaneous movement); (3) privacy (physical and mental privacy); (4) a picture of themselves as a physical person (choice of clothing, degree of neatness, demeanor).

Outcomes of Goffman's observations are apparent in today's recruit. RTC must deal with many emotional and societal barriers to training and transforming recruits to meet their mission requirement. Some of those emotional barriers are: loneliness, separation anxiety, depression, removal from civilian "comfort zone," inability to deal with a new environment, feelings of "not fitting in," and the "unknown" (Goffman, 1961). Table 1 shows the societal barriers to training at RTC based on pre-service profile data.

Table 1. Social Barriers to Training at RTC

Social Barrier	Percentage of Recruits
Sexual, Emotional, or Physical Abuse	40
Victim or Perpetrator of Extreme Violence	25
Observer of Extreme Violence	14
Contemplated Suicide	40

Source: RTC Brief to Secretary of Defense Cohen, September 1997

A further point is that the civil-military relationship determines the type of people the Navy will recruit. Civilian attitudes and work ethic do not seem to be easily transformed into Navy attitudes and work ethic. RTC briefed Secretary of Defense William S. Cohen in September of 1997 about fleet expectations of sailors graduating from RTC. Fleet expectations consisted of thirteen areas:

1. Having a full seabag (required clothing issued at RTC)
2. A working knowledge of core values (Honor, Courage, and Commitment)
3. Meet Physical Readiness Standards
4. Enthusiasm about their future in the Navy
5. Arrive ready for duty (medical and dental readiness)
6. Possess a healthy self-esteem
7. Understand Navy Right and Responsibilities
8. Be a recruiter
9. Understand the What and Why of Zero Tolerance
10. Succeed in a gender-neutral environment
11. Possess basic military knowledge

12. Succeed in a multi-racial/cultural environment

13. Possess orders 30 days prior to transfer

Many of these fleet requirements are met through education and training, however, some areas such as enthusiasm, self-esteem, and succeeding in a multi-racial/cultural and gender-neutral environment may not be as easily instilled during training at RTC.

In response to the societal barriers and culture, RTC has adopted a "gentler" boot camp. In an article by James Kitfield, "Boot Camp Lite," (February 1998), Recruit Division Commanders (RDCs) are the Navy's version of the "drill instructor." RDCs know that new recruits are expecting the Hollywood version of boot camp—in-your-face yelling and screaming, profanity, and an occasional boot to the backside—but it never comes. Instead the RDCs are firm but surprisingly patient and restrained in explaining exactly what the recruits can expect for the next nine weeks. The RDCs say, "We are the people you will fear the most, but we are also the people that care about you the most. We want you to succeed. We may yell at you, but no one is going to physically abuse you or call you names" (Kitfield, 1998:45) The RDC Creed is, "These recruits are entrusted to my care. I will train them to the best of my ability. I will develop them into smartly disciplined, physically fit, basically trained sailors. I will instill in them, and demonstrate by my own example, the highest standard of honor, courage and commitment" (RDC Training Manual:1). "Breaking them down" and "building them back up" through trauma and terrorism is no longer considered appropriate for boot camp.

Kitfield explains three other factors that have contributed to the new RTC curriculum: (1) a desire to have a lower attrition rate in an increasingly difficult recruiting environment; (2) a desire to minimize personal abuse in a more racially and ethnically diverse military; and (3) the need to accommodate "Generation X" recruits, who are characterized as less physically fit and disciplined, yet smarter and more inquisitive than their predecessors (Kitfield, 1998).

According to Admiral Green, Commander of Naval Training Center at Great Lakes, the Navy also discovered that the fear and intimidation model of leadership evident at RTC in the past was at odds with the fundamental culture in the fleet. Admiral Green said, "Why would you train recruits and officers trainees with a model of leadership that you would never think of applying in the fleet? In the fleet, you're taught to value everyone you serve with, junior and senior, and you are all part of the same team. What's the matter with applying that model to boot camp, while still providing an environment that is very demanding emotionally, physically and mentally?" (Kitfield, 1998:48).

Kitfield argues that RTC had to change because today's recruit is not a mirror of earlier generations. They reflect American youth at the end of the 20th century: radically and ethnically diverse, often the product of broken homes, computer literate but less physically fit than their predecessors. They represent the social strata that range from "farm kids to former gangbangers." As a result, RTC has found itself spending more time and effort teaching core values and ethics—topics RTC once took for granted (Kitfield, 1998).

Admiral Green states, "I'm afraid some of the old guard sometimes mistake their [new recruits in the fleet] enthusiasm and inquisitiveness for a lack of discipline. If we harness their tremendous enthusiasm, shape it, form it and put it to work for us, then I have no worries about the performance of our graduates [from NTC and RTC] in the fleet" (Kitfield, 1998:49).

Changes to RTC's curriculum appear to be for social purposes and to meet endstrength requirements. High-ranking Navy leadership has required some of these changes while others have come from congressional inquiries; it may be that some of these changes have not addressed the needs of the fleet.

E. ORGANIZATIONAL CONFIGURATIONS

Organizational configuration is defined as a "constellation of conceptually distinct characteristics that commonly occur together" (Meyer, Tsui, and Hinings, 1993). Configurations represent an organization's attributes such as its operating environment, strategy, structure, culture, beliefs, and processes. These attributes fall into a coherent pattern and create the organization as a whole. These attributes must cohere and be related in some stable and understandable way.

Theoretical configurations are derived in two ways. Some are conceptually identified (Roberts, 1998) as ideal types based on *a priori* distinctions. Weber (1947) distinguished between traditional and bureaucratic types of organizations. Burns and Stalker (1961) compared organic and mechanistic forms of organizing. Other configurations are developed through empirical classification of data. Miller and Friesen (1984) used

statistical manipulation of organizational information to identify clusters of variables and their relationships in large organizational samples.

There are two organizational dimensions that have consistently surfaced in organizational research: efficiency and effectiveness (Ostroff and Schmitt, 1993). Efficiency and effectiveness play an important role in organizational performance, however they compete for resources and can interfere with each other. Efficiency depends on focus, precision, repetition, analysis, discipline, rationale, and control (Handy, 1995). Effectiveness relies on serendipity, experimentation, novelty, free association, madness, loose discipline, and relaxed control. Effectiveness thrives on exploration and efficiency attempts to drive out exploration (Handy, 1995).

According to Roberts' (1998) view of organizations, there are considered to be four types of organizational configurations: (1) Adaptive; (2) Directive; (3) Political/Reactive; and (4) Generative. This paper concentrates on the first three configurations because they identify the types of configuration that recruits, RTC, and the fleet operate within. The fourth configuration—generative—has not been fully developed at the time of this thesis (Roberts, 1998).

The adaptive configuration optimizes organizational effectiveness and collaboration. An organization that adapts to its external environment to achieve effectiveness and has little concern for efficiency is related to what one might find in a research and development organization. There is little direct authority—the general manager is a champion of innovation (Miles and Snow, 1978; Mintzberg, 1996). Flexibility, creativity, exploration

and experimentation are far more important than rigid order and control. Roberts explains, "You can use this configuration to explain how children survive in today's society" (Roberts, 1998). In an adaptive society there is very little guidance in telling the individual how to think or act. This configuration may explain some of the attributes found in the "X-Generation." Generally, today's new recruits may come from an adaptive configuration and are then forced into a directive configuration while at RTC.

The directive configuration optimizes efficiency and shows less concern for effectiveness. These organizations strive to run like well-oiled machines (Miles and Snow, 1978; Mintzberg, 1996). These organizations focus on maintaining internal order and avoid external influences. There are formalized jobs and standardized work to maintain order and coordination. There are uniform policies that cover rights and responsibilities, while promotions are based on competence and merit, and impersonal role relations ensure smooth workflow. The organization is designed with a top-down hierarchy and standard operating procedures. Most military commands and machine bureaucracies operate in a directive configuration where tasks are standardized, specialized, and formalized. The norms in a directive configuration are order, stability, and respect for higher authority.

In a political/reactive organization, the general manager does not strive toward efficiency or effectiveness. The general manager may act in response to effectiveness issues at one moment and then to efficiency issues the next. This creates a disjointed pattern of activity and is in response to the demands of a political environment. The general manager assumes the role of crisis manager who puts out the political fires as they start. General

managers may choose to join in the political atmosphere by building a power base to push their own agenda to satisfy their own self-interests.

An example of the political/reactive configuration at RTC is indicated in an article by Admiral Green, Commander of Naval Training Center, Great Lakes (Green, 1997). RTC has changed its training program to keep the attrition rate—recruits that do not complete training—below 40 percent. Congressional inquiries and Naval Technical Training Reviews—outside influences—have driven many changes in RTC's curriculum. For example, the first day a recruit spends at RTC is a day of rest; not a day that leads to sleep deprivation as in the past. This change began with a congressional inquiry as requested by a parent whose child quit training only a few hours into the first day. These "outside influences," which are not controlled by RTC, have forced that organization to work in a political/reactive configuration. A political/reactive configuration (Roberts, 1998) consists of an organization that is reactive to the outside environment and makes changes to please political authority. The role of the Commanding Officer in such a configuration is that of a crisis manager while the staff essentially act as firefighters, putting out smaller emergent "fires" as they develop.

RTC also works in a directive configuration where the organization is coordinated through hierarchical leadership and organized like a machine bureaucracy (Mintzberg, 1996). In this configuration, the Commanding Officer is the strategic apex of the organization and in this role, sets the course with centralized decision making.

This mixture of political/reactive and directive configuration creates a difficult working environment (Roberts, 1998). In the political/reactive configuration, the leadership must attempt to satisfy conflicting stakeholders; i.e., Congress and the fleet, and is forced to compromise decision making based on the stakeholder with the strongest power base. The stakeholder with the strongest power base may well be Congress. Therefore, under the directive configuration, leadership must enforce new directions, or in the case of RTC, new curriculum changes. As such, that may be in direct conflict to the RTC's mission: to prepare recruits to maintain fleet readiness.

F. THE NAVY ENLISTED OCCUPATIONAL CLASSIFICATION SYSTEM

The Navy Enlisted Occupational Classification System (NEOCS) provides the means by which all Navy enlisted personnel are classified to support training, advancement, and distribution of personnel within that classification system (The Navy Manual of Enlisted Manpower and Personnel Classification and Occupational Standards).

A six-digit number identifies each Naval Standard. The first three digits identify the topic title, the fourth digit identifies the pay grade and the last two digits sequentially identify the specific Naval Standard within that pay grade. The Naval Standards for pay grade E-2 can be found in Appendix B.

Transforming a civilian into a sailor is a difficult job with many complexities. Some difficulties in the transformation process may begin with the civil-military gap, which may lead to difficulties in recruiting the number of civilians needed to maintain fleet readiness. RTC may need to alter training methodologies to lowering the attrition rate of

these difficult-to-find recruits. Also, the Navy must answer to Congress every year regarding training, manning, and readiness issues, which may influence curriculum changes at RTC. Training changes made at RTC, to ensure readiness is maintained, may not be conducive to fleet needs.

III. DATA AND METHODS

A. DATA COLLECTION

The thesis uses information obtained through personal interviews and observation to explore the perceptions of General Detail (GENDET) personnel and their direct supervisors concerning training at Recruit Training Command (RTC) and its relevance to fleet expectations. Observations and interviews at RTC indicate the environment in which Recruit Division Commanders (RDCs) must train recruits and the goals of RTC. Interviews with fleet GENDETs and their direct supervisors (Officers and Chiefs) were utilized for insight into fleet needs compared to the output of RTC.

The sample is a diverse mixture of personnel, though they remain within the scope of the current study. Both enlisted men and women were interviewed at RTC and onboard ship. All officers interviewed were male. The total sample interviewed consisted of 54 naval personnel, including 48 enlisted personnel and six officers. The pay grade of the sample ranged from E-1 (basic recruit) to O-3 (Lieutenant). Table 2 describes the categories of the groups interviewed. Before each interview, the researcher provided a brief visual (see Figure 1.) and verbal overview of the nature of the topic and stressed the individual's right to privacy.

Formal, structured interviews with recruits, Instructors, RDCs, and staff officers were conducted at Recruit Training Command, Great Lakes over the period 11-15 May 1998. The sample of recruits (n=14) ranged in age from 18 to 26 years of age and a variety of civilian backgrounds. The sample of RDCs (n=18), classroom instructors (n=7) and staff

officers (n=3) at RTC Great Lakes came from a wide range of fleet ratings and held a variety of positions, (i.e., Quality Assurance, Command Assessment Team, Command Managed Equal Opportunity Advisor, and RDC Instructors), within the Recruit Training Command. The recruits in the interviews were selected based on availability, by the RTC staff and were on day 6-2 of their training, which indicates the sixth week, and the second day of the that week of training. Two groups were interviewed, one from an all-female division and one group of males from an integrated division.

Some RTC interviews were formally scheduled and some were impromptu (discussing issues with recruits and RDCs in-transit from one part of RTC to another). A professional and relaxing atmosphere was established to put all respondents at ease in an attempt to elicit honest responses. Recruits were easy to put at ease in the formal interviews, however, those stopped in transit appeared to be nervous or upset emotionally (most thought they were in some sort of trouble because the researcher stopped then and was in uniform). All officers interviewed at RTC were of equal rank to the researcher (O-3), while all other personnel were junior in rank (E-1 – E-8). The interview questions were open-ended to allow the respondents to discuss tangential subjects, if they desired. The questions asked of each group are shown in Appendix A. Occasionally, probing questions were required during the interview process to clarify a point made by the respondent.

Formal interviews with GENDETs, division officers and chiefs were conducted on the USS Juneau (LPD-10), USS Chancellorsville (CG-62) and USS Fitzgerald (DDG-62), respectively. Shipboard interviews were conducted 22-24 June 1998 in San Diego, CA. All

shipboard interviews were conducted in a private room aboard each ship. The fleet sample consisted of First Lieutenant Division Officers (n=3), Deck Division Chiefs (n=3) and GENDETs (n=6).

Table 2. Description of Sample Groups

Group	Description	Pay grade	Number
1	Recruits	E-1 to E-2	14
2	Recruit Division Commanders	E-5 to E-8	18
3	RTC Staff Officers	O-3	3
4	RTC Classroom Instructors	E-5 to E-7	7
5	GENDETs	E-1 to E-3	6
6	Division Officers	O-2	3
7	Division Chiefs	E-7	3

The Navy Enlisted Occupational Classification System (NEOCS) for pay grade E-2 was used for comparative analysis of naval standards to RTC curriculum content. Career fields are not addressed, however, the standard knowledge and skills required for all personnel in pay grade E-2 are used. These basic knowledge and skill requirements are Naval Standards. Naval Standards refer to those minimal capabilities, which the Navy expects and requires of individuals within each rate and rating. Standards are expressed in terms of task statements (duties and responsibilities) and they represent the abilities, knowledge, and skills needed to accomplish those tasks, duties and responsibilities. These Naval Standards form the basis for implementing and supporting actions for recruit training, military requirements training, and advancement.

The researcher contrasted RTC's curriculum against NEOCS for pay grade E-2 to determine course content at RTC. Appendix B contains the standard knowledge and skill requirements for enlisted personnel in pay grade E-2.

B. DATA ANALYSIS AND THEME DEVELOPMENT

The interview data were content analyzed to identify the perceptions and experiences of GENDET sailors regarding requirements in the fleet compared to the training received at RTC. Salient descriptive themes were developed within each group. These themes are presented in Chapter IV with supporting excerpts.

To evaluate RTC's course content with respect to naval standards, the researcher used the naval standard skills and knowledge requirements for an enlisted person in pay grade E-2. The skills and knowledge listed in NEOCS were cross-referenced to course content at RTC contained in the Recruit Trainee Guide (1998) and the Recruit Training Timetable (RTC Master Training Syllabus).

IV. RESULTS

A. OVERVIEW

Chapter IV, Results, summarizes eight main themes concerning fleet expectations and training at RTC, which emerged from the data described in the previous chapter. The themes represent the perceptions of current fleet requirements at the GENDET level compared to current training at RTC. The themes are illustrated by quotations from the interviews. The number in parentheses (e.g., # 4) identifies the interviewee and the corresponding data sheet and transcript of the interview. No names were provided to maintain individual anonymity. The eight themes are divided in two sections, first by fleet interviews and then by RTC interviews and observations. Because the number of interviewees is small, the themes should be considered preliminary within the context of exploratory research. Following the themes is a comparative analysis of the RTC curriculum and NEOCS.

B. **THEME I: FLEET FIRST LIEUTENANT DIVISION OFFICERS AND DIVISION CHIEFS THINK THAT MOST GENDETS LACK COMMITMENT AND A STRONG WORK ETHIC**

The theme was consistent throughout all the interviews with shipboard officers and chiefs. The officers perceived new GENDET sailors only wanted to work to minimum requirements and not conduct any work beyond what they are told.

A Lieutenant Junior Grade (# 3) stated:

GENDETs seem to feel proud to make it to work on time or show up for duty as required. They tend to think of their work as being in the way of their social life. They don't understand an honest day's work for honest day's pay. 'Do the minimums and get out of here.'

A Chief (# 3) stated:

I know it is something that you grow up with, but I wish there were a way to start instilling a work ethic in boot camp. Do they teach them 'attention to detail' any more?

One Chief (# 2) stated:

Part of the core values is commitment. Commitment must be to oneself and to the team or ship. This part of commitment is not being taught at RTC.

Based on the Recruit Trainee Guide (March 1998), commitment is defined as, "The day-to-day duty of every man and woman in the Department of the Navy is to join together as a team to improve the quality of our work, our people, and ourselves." (p. 110). One part of the creed to commitment is to, "Exhibit the highest degree of moral character, professional excellence, quality and competence in all that I do." (p. 110). Recruits are taught this lesson, however it does not appear to be emphasized throughout RTC training, as it does not appear to be internalized by the time recruits enter the fleet. Core values instruction is conducted in the classroom during day of training (DOT) 1-2 and again at DOT 8-1. (In DOT the first number represents the week of training and the second number represents the day in that week of training).

C. THEME II: FLEET FIRST LIEUTENANT DIVISION OFFICERS AND DIVISION CHIEFS FEEL THAT SOME GENDETS LACK PRIDE IN OWNERSHIP

The theme was not as prevalent on newer ships (less than 4 years old). The newer ship (Arleigh Burke Class) is on her second Commanding Officer and there are still three "plank-owners" onboard. A plank-owner is a person that was assigned to the ship when it was newly commissioned.

The officers and chiefs onboard the older ships (ships 9 to 29 years old) perceive the problem of pride in ownership as a social issue that stems from how children are raised in today's society. Perhaps it stems from the point that GENDET sailors on older ships have not seen the true definition of 'clean' compared to those GENDET sailors doing the same job on a much newer ship. Clean is defined as conducting preventative maintenance, which ensures no rust or dirt on the equipment being maintained.

A Chief (# 3) stated:

Being on a newer ship like this is like buying a new car. You can smell the newness and want to maintain that new smell as long as you can. These sailors understand what new looks like and if they keep the ship looking new then their job is easier in the long run. The supervisors (E-4 to E-5) have real attention to detail and are trying to teach that to our newer sailors. Attention to detail leads to pride in ownership.

A Chief (# 2) stated:

I have been attached to many commands over the years and have never had such a difficult time trying to get deck seamen to do their jobs beyond the minimum, they just want to do the minimum and get off the ship. Their personal lives are more important than this ship. This ship is their home for the next four years and they don't seem to care about it. They lack attention to detail. I learned attention to detail in boot camp and it seems that they (RTC) have stopped teaching that.

The officers and chiefs of the older ships think their E-4 and E-5 supervisors had to learn attention to detail in their training and were excellent at teaching the GENDETs about attention to detail. This indicates there may be a learning curve and attention to detail needs to be taught.

RTC teaches a classroom lesson on professionalism on DOT 2-1. This lesson topic explains accountability for actions and inaction. This lesson topic also addresses

responsibility to the team, ship, Navy and the United States. The lesson topic on professionalism also discusses leadership and followership. The professionalism lesson topic indicates that RTC attempts to educate recruits on fleet expectations, but it may be that the topic can not be fully understood without hands-on experience, such as, conducting actual preventative maintenance on a ship's system.

D. THEME III: FLEET FIRST LIEUTENANT DIVISION OFFICERS AND DIVISION CHIEFS FEEL THAT SOME GENDETS LACK RESPECT TOWARD AUTHORITY

The theme was evident on all three ships. GENDET lack of respect was focused toward the chain of command, the ship, authority, and rules. It was unanimous across all three ships that the worst offenders of this theme were in the minority, however.

A LTJG (# 2) stated:

One in ten GENDETs show gross disrespect toward the chain of command, the ship, authority, and/or rules. I discharged one for gross lack of respect toward the chain of command and I am about to discharge another for disrespect toward the ship, he tried to break some equipment instead of cleaning it.

GENDETs were disrespectful in different areas—disrespect toward their peers and immediate supervisors and disrespect toward the ship's rules for safety.

A LTJG (# 1) stated:

Those that check onboard with a bad attitude are in the minority. We do our best to steer them in the right direction, but we are not always successful. Those who resist our guidance are usually discharged.

Other evidence occurred when one chief explained how a GENDET greeted his Division Officer upon initial introduction, "Hey, man. What's up?" The chief goes on to explain that he sees many young sailors ducking for cover when morning or evening colors

are played so they don't have to salute or stand at attention. He feels this is a distinct lack of respect for the American flag and the country.

RTC attempts to teach recruits about respect for authority and the nation on a daily basis. The RDCs are in command and a chain of command is established among the recruits—Recruit Chief Petty Officer, Recruit Petty Officer, Master at Arms, and a Recruit Administrative Petty Officer. Recruits are taught to use this chain of command, but not necessarily to respect those in the chain of command. The RDCs are respected because they are the only "defined" authority figures and have the power to discipline.

E. THEME IV: FLEET FIRST LIEUTENANT DIVISION OFFICERS AND DIVISION CHIEFS FEEL THAT SOME GENDETS DO NOT UNDERSTAND TEAMWORK

The officers and chiefs noticed that some of today's GENDETs do not work well with others. Some of these GENDETs have their own idea of how their job should be completed without regard to those working on the same team.

A Chief (# 2) stated:

These kids (GENDETs) are very individualistic. They do not like to work as a team. They think they know the best way to get the job done and they have very limited experience. I am shocked how they don't work well together. I always have an E-5 or E-6 supervising a group to make sure hostilities stay down to a low roar.

Lack of teamwork can lead to a disaster when conducting line handling or underway replenishment operations. Being part of the team also implies watch standing. If one person on a watch team is not properly standing watch, then disaster could strike and cause grave damage to the ship or the crew.

According to one Chief (# 1):

RTC must not teach the value of teamwork. When these kids (GENDETs) check onboard they expect personal space and individual attention; maybe that is from their upbringing. They are used to doing things on their own. I try to show them the big picture on why teamwork is so important, but not many want to buy into it.

RTC teaches teamwork in the classroom, in labs, and as part of a recruit's daily routine. The RTC Recruit Trainee Guide (March 1998) explains watch standing as a team member and as an individual. Recruits are required to stand watches throughout their training. Marlinespike is a teamwork-oriented lab where recruits practice line-handling techniques. Drill or marching is also considered a teamwork event. Marching is a daily occurrence and one of the few modes of transportation while at RTC. There are the Seamanship Olympics, which compare one division's seamanship and teamwork skills against those of another division. In order to be successful in these events, recruits must learn to communicate and work as a team.

RTC stresses teamwork during a recruit's daily routine however, teamwork may be a foreign concept to many recruits and may not be easily learned. Chapter II, the Literature Review, explained how today's family environment and norms are very different from those in the Navy. A large percentage of single-parent families and dual-income families in today's society may lead to an environment of self-preservation for the children. Self-preservation implies primary concern for one's own survival. Individual survival entails making decisions that affect only one and not others. These individualistic norms may be difficult to change. It is unknown to the researcher if the problem of teamwork should be

considered a training, leadership, or societal issue, however, it is an important area of concern for those in the fleet.

F. THEME V: RTC STAFF WORKS IN A POLITICAL/REACTIVE CONFIGURATION AS AN ORGANIZATION

The political/reactive configuration (Lindblom, 1959; 1979) is characterized by an organization that bases its decision-making on politics or political authority. The organization tasks or jobs are fluid and determined by associations. Implementation of objectives lacks coherence among organizational parts and responsiveness to political authority is the norm. The main role of a General Manager—in this case the Commanding Officer—is crisis management.

The political/reactive configuration concentrate their efforts on crisis management appears evident at the staff level in the daily operations of RTC. Staff personnel are responsible for ensuring the training guides are current based on congressional inquiries and less on fleet feedback.

RTC staff LT (# 1) stated:

I spend most of my time responding to congressional inquiries about our training methods and content. Many times the curriculum changes due to these inquiries. We seldom get a chance to look at what we need to include in the curriculum or instructor guides because we are always reacting to everyone else. Sometimes I feel like I work in a fishbowl.

It appeared that some new training guidelines are implemented without a pilot program and solely on the request of a congressperson.

An RDC Chief (# 8) stated:

We were told by a congressman to start marching with rifles again because it would build discipline in today's young sailor. So the command (RTC) spent a half a million dollars on rifles with the firing pin removed. Then we realized we needed security for the rifles when they were not being used. The rifles were stored in these racks (in the division spaces), which cost another half a million dollars. We had to add another recruit to the division watch bill to meet the requirements of the two-man rule. This meant more recruits were missing out on training because they were in the division spaces.

All of this money was spent without looking into a pilot program to see if marching with rifles would benefit the recruits and no one looked into the security issues, we just did it. What a waste of money, marching with rifles lasted 6 months and we stopped because of the logistic nightmares and lack of value-added training.

The RDC Excellence Award Program is designed to recognize RDCs for sustained superior leadership, professionalism and accomplishment in training recruit divisions. This program has come under scrutiny by some RDCs because of the difficulty in achieving this milestone. The RDC's performance is dependent on how well their division performs and the RDCs ability to counsel and ensure recruits meet medical and dental appointments. Division performance is based on academics, disciplinary and physical fitness setbacks or failures, and the number of compartment and street infractions or individual 'chits' the division receives during training. Chits are taken from recruits when another RDC or staff officer has noticed an infraction. The chit is processed into the division database and returned to the RDC for action. Because "pulling chits" goes against an RDC's points for the RDC Excellence Award, it is not uncommon for an RDC to 'pull' chits on other divisions and then spend every possible minute with their own division to avoid having

their 'chits pulled.' This tactic may be used to ensure minimal points lost for an RDC's division while attempting to maximize point loss for other RDCs. This type of "gaming" is considered not in the spirit of recruit training and possibly goes against the mission of RTC.

An RDC E-6 (# 14) stated:

I like the idea of the RDC excellence award program, but I do not like the process. It entices RDCs to 'game the system' and try to bring down other RDCs.

An RDC Chief (# 2) stated:

RDCs spend too much time trying to win a personal award. They 'game the system' instead of really training the recruits. If a recruit does not march well, the RDC ensures he/she has a medical appointment when their division is being inspected for drill excellence. I think the RDC excellence award program has tainted actual RDC performance and abilities.

RTC trains recruits in a directive configuration, where there is a hierarchical chain of command within each division, the RDC is the strategic apex with a top down flow of information for efficiency (Miles and Snow, 1978), and controls for conduct are based on rules and regulations. Though recruit training is conducted in a directive configuration, RTC—as an organization—appears to operate in a political/reactive configuration. RDCs work in both configurations, which, according to Roberts (1998), leads to a very unhealthy working environment. An RTC Command Climate Survey (November, 1997) was given to the entire Recruit Training Command. This implies that all RDCs, instructors, staff, and support personnel were surveyed. A statement under the category Job Characteristics and sub-category Situational Constraints appears to reflect a political working environment based on responses to the statement, "Work surroundings get in the way of getting the job done." The responses to the statement ranged from "1= strongly disagree" to "6= strongly

agree.” A mean score of 4.57 ($s = .79$) ($n = 400$) to this statement indicate that most respondents tend to agree with the statement. The response to this statement may indicate a political work environment as a constraint to job performance.

The two political environments the RDCs work under may constrain them from producing the best possible sailors for the fleet. The first political environment is that of the leadership at RTC. The leaders of RTC appear to make curriculum changes based on outside influences—congressional inquiries and Naval Technical Training Reviews—and not necessarily on inputs from the fleet or the RDCs. These decisions are forced upon the RDCs in a directive environment. The RDC is the strategic apex for the division and may feel that some curriculum changes are not worth emphasizing, this could be a detriment to the overall quality training of the recruits. The second political environment is political/reactive, which appears to stem from the RDC Excellence Award Program. The Excellence Award Program may force some RDCs to ‘game the system’ instead of challenging all of the recruits to do their best for the division.

Admiral Green (1997) stated in his own article, “Building Sailors Better,” about changes in RTC’s training curriculum, “In recent years, attrition was skyrocketing and far too many recruits were resorting to dangerous—often self-destructive—behavior,” because of the isolation and intimidation of boot camp. This statement is indicative of decision-making based on external influences. RTC changed its curriculum to lower attrition and to meet the perceived needs of today's youth.

G. THEME VI: RTC CONCENTRATES A LARGE PORTION OF TRAINING ON MILITARY DRILL

RTC is designed to educate and train recruits in technical, military, physical, and uniform requirements. The RTC Master Training Schedule (May 1998) indicates a majority of training time at RTC is devoted to military drill. There are approximately 803 hours of training time allotted in the recruit training timetable, and 733 hours allotted for health and comfort. Health and comfort comprises sleep, meals, medical and dental processing, haircuts, holiday routine each Sunday—attend religious services, write and read letters, work on uniforms, lounge, shower, and other personal items. Recruit training time comprises 52 percent of a recruit's total time at RTC with 48 percent devoted to health and comfort. Of the total recruit training time, approximately 16 percent is devoted to technical training (classroom/lab). Miscellaneous military training consumes approximately 15 percent of the training time. RDC training—ensuring recruits daily and evening routines are completed and additional recruit training in any area the RDC feels the division needs extra work—is 33 percent of the training time. Military drill consumes 23 percent of the training, military uniform training consumes 4 percent of the training, and approximately 9 percent of the training time is dedicated to physical training. (See Figure 2 for a graphic representation of the components of recruit training time.)

RDC time and drill time are separate timetables. Approximately one-third of the recruits' training timetable is dedicated to RDC time. The RDC is given the flexibility to train the divisions as he or she desires without the aid of an Instructor Guide. This suggests RDC

training time topics and instruction may be non-standardized. RDC time may be used for expounding on classroom topics, answering questions about the Navy, RTC, or general life




Figure 2. Percentage of Recruit Training Time in Major Areas

questions. Much of the time is devoted to preparing the division for one of four classroom tests or one of three drill inspections.

A recruit (#14) stated:

It is obvious that the RDCs are trying to win the drill flag to make themselves look good. Why don't we spend more time learning about the Navy and less time marching around for their personal gratification? They (RDCs) could teach us so much more about the Navy and what to expect when we go to the fleet or our follow-on schools, but they would rather have us march.

A GENDET (# 4) stated:

There was a lot of down time during boot camp. We would have our schedule set and would hurry up to get to where we were supposed to be and then wait. We had our Trainee Guide with us all the time, but we were not always required to study it unless we had a test coming soon. We spent a lot of time being quiet or practicing drill. We could have been learning something else that would have helped us in the fleet.

A GENDET (# 6) stated in reference to all the time spent on drill:

I just came from boot camp three months ago. I was not prepared for the physical readiness test (PRT) last month. I think boot camp needs to add more physical training.

A recruit (# 7) stated:

I thought I would get more physical training. My dad is a retired chief and he told me about all the physical training he went through (in boot camp), so I prepared for that and it isn't happening. I think more physical training would be better than more marching. I think getting physically fit builds self-esteem.

RDCs concentrate RDC time on drill through the seventh Saturday of training—
Pass-In-Review and final drill evaluation.

An RDC E-6 (# 16) stated:

Winning the drill flag and academic flag is a morale booster for the division. There is also an incentive for the RDCs to win these flags because they gain points toward the RDC Excellence Award, which is very difficult to achieve.

Many of the RDCs like the autonomy of using the RDC time, as they desire.

An RDC E-6 (# 12) spoke for the majority of the RDCs by stating:

I have pushed four divisions and none of them have been the same. Each one needed some kind of special attention. If we were stuck to a rigid schedule (RDC time) then we would be hard pressed to give each division special attention or enhanced training. You can't build an instructor guide for each division's individual needs.

It appears RDCs enjoy the autonomy of flexible training during RDC training time.

Recruits feel that RDC time is used more for a self-serving purpose by the RDC. Much of the RDC time is spent preparing the recruits for written exams and practicing military drill.

H. THEME VII: RTC IS DESIGNED AS A SOCIALIZATION PROCESS

One of RTC's critical inherent functions is developing patterns of human behavior.

RTC's training philosophy (Recruit Training Command Brief, 1997) is to make responsible

change, understand the adult learning process, instill core values, develop warriors, and build self-discipline. To enhance the training philosophy, RTC has developed some "Tools for Success." These tools include programs to assist recruits in educational deficiencies and behavioral skills.

Fundamental Applied Skills Training (FAST) is designed to improve recruits' oral communications skills. FAST is available to recruits if English is their second language, or they scored a 42 or less on their verbal composite score (VE), which is the composite score of word knowledge and paragraph comprehension portion of the Armed Services Vocational Aptitude Battery (ASVAB). The mean score for VE (ASVAB Test Manual 1984) is 52.88 with a standard deviation of 6.37. Reading comprehension training is used to increase literacy and to understand Navy vocabulary. Also, under the FAST program are study techniques to improve academic performance for recruits who fail the same test two times.

FAST is needed with the ethnic diversity of the United States and the difficulty in recruiting those with the highest ASVAB scores.

An RDC Chief (# 7) stated:

I have a recruit from Zimbabwe, and one from Spain. They speak very little English and I send them both to FAST. They are learning quickly, but have difficulty understanding Navy slang. You can see the curiosity in their eyes when I use Navy slang; they need a lot of attention.

Personal Applied Skills Streaming (PASS) is designed for those recruits who refuse to train, have suicide ideation, disruptive behavior, low self-esteem, lack motivation, have problems dealing with authority, need anger management, or are unable to deal with

cultural diversity. PASS is an important tool for RTC since 40 percent of recruits' pre-service profiles (1997) include contemplation of suicide, sexual, emotional, or physical abuse, and 64 percent of recruits have been exposed to extreme violence in the form of being a victim, perpetrator, or observer. The PASS course assists recruits in dealing with emotional barriers to learning and gives recruits enhanced coping skills to enable them to function in the fleet.

An RDC E-5 (# 9) stated:

Some of these kids bring a lot of extra baggage with them. I don't know why they are being recruited or how they are making it through the screening process. We spend a lot of time trying to fix their social problems.

RTC curriculum consists of classes to deal with expected behavior. Classes such as discrimination, sexual harassment/fraternization, rape awareness, Uniform Code of Military Justice, professionalism, and core values are indicative of behavioral expectation in the navy. These rules and regulations about behavior may not have been addressed to recruits while in the civilian sector and may be foreign. These are essential areas of education to assist the fleet in managing new recruits and their behaviors.

I. THEME VIII: RTC PREPARES RECRUITS FOR THE FLEET THROUGH SOCIALIZATION AND EDUCATION; THE FLEET WANTS SAILORS THAT FOLLOW ORDERS AND WORK HARD

In analyzing formal and informal interview responses and determining the first seven themes, it appeared there were two overriding themes. These two themes: RTC prepares recruits for the fleet through socialization and education, and the fleet wants followers and workers, shows a possible disparity between RTC output and the needs of the fleet.

It is important to realize that socialization and education are important for introductory training. Theme VI, "RTC is Designed as a Socialization Process," is important for the recruit to make a smoother transition from civilian life to the fleet. Socialization and education prepare recruits for the fleet and follow-on training as part of RTC's mission. RTC attempts to instill Navy culture in recruits while in an isolated environment. The training methodology is through direct communication—classroom instruction—and indirectly through a recruit's daily interaction within the division. Separate courses such as PASS and FAST help prepare some recruits for the fleet by enhancing their learning and coping skills. Classroom topics such as the Uniform Code of Military Justice, discrimination, rape awareness, core values, sexual harassment/fraternization, and professionalism assist recruits in understanding the new rules and regulations they are expected to work under, and the values and norms expected of them in the fleet.

Themes I, III, and IV (p. 31, 34, and 35, respectively) indicate that a valued part of Navy culture is not being learned at RTC; i.e., working hard, respect for authority, and teamwork. At RTC, a few recruits are put in positions of authority within their respective divisions: Recruit Chief Petty Officer, Recruit Petty Officer, Recruit Division Administrative Petty Officer, Recruit Training Petty Officer, and the Recruit Master at Arms. These recruits are normally picked for these positions based on their maturity, education, past civilian and/or military experience, and in the case of the Master at Arms, physical size. There appears to be a lack of hands-on training at RTC for all recruits to personally experience hard work, respect for authority, and teamwork. Being in a position

of authority may be a valuable learning experience for the recruits to teach respect and the value of teamwork.

According to Theme II, (p. 32), the fleet wants workers with pride in ownership. RTC produces, in the eyes of those interviewed in the fleet, "kids without drive or discipline." Fleet division officers and chiefs agree that new sailors need to internalize self-pride, pride in ownership, work ethic, and respect. However, self-pride, pride in ownership, and work ethic do not appear to be taught at RTC. According to the researcher, RTC could enhance self-pride by making boot camp more challenging from the very beginning. One GENDET said, "being in the fleet is much harder than being in boot camp." Perhaps RTC may need to create an atmosphere of "needing to belong" instead of "needing to just get by." Perhaps this is a point to consider in future RTC decisions.

J. COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF RTC TRAINING CURRICULUM WITH NAVY ENLISTED OCCUPATIONAL CLASSIFICATIONS SYSTEM

A comparative analysis indicated that 74 percent of the standards (n= 174) required in the NEOCS was addressed in the RTC curriculum. However, there were 15 discrepancies between the NEOCS requirement for E-2 and the RTC curriculum that may need to be addressed and implemented in recruit training. Other knowledge and skill discrepancies between RTC and NEOCS should be addressed at the fleet level. The six-digit code for each of the 15 discrepancies is bolded in Appendix B. Each of the discrepancies is noted below and discussed briefly.

The 15 discrepancies noted between RTC curriculum and NEOCS were (code/skill or knowledge):

1. 902202: Procedures for locating and reporting an object by relative bearing and position angle.
2. 903201: Individual positions and facings without arms.
3. 911217: Purpose, use and procedures of the Navy tag out system.
4. 911218: Safety procedures to follow when lifting objects.
5. 921207: Conditions that cause spontaneous combustion.
6. 921210: Shipboard piping identification coding system.
7. 921216: Identification of damage control lockers and use of contents.
8. 921217: Methods and procedures for communications in a damage control situation.
9. 922201: Cleaning and stowing of painting equipment.
10. 922202: Purpose for cleaning and preservation.
11. 922203: Equipment, methods and procedures for preparing and painting a surface.
12. 922204: Methods and procedures for preserving surfaces not to be painted.
13. 941214: Purpose of professional development board.
14. 941218: Dependents rights, privileges and benefits.
15. 942201: Personnel qualification standards (PQS) system.

The first discrepancy: procedures for locating and reporting an object by relative bearing and position angle, is knowledge required by all sailors who stand lookout watches. Watch standing entails clear communication. In order for a lookout watch stander to

communicate clearly, he or she must understand how to communicate vital lookout information to other personnel on watch. This entails procedures for locating and reporting objects by relative bearing and position angle.

The second discrepancy: individual positions and facings without arms, appears to be over-emphasized at RTC. It was noted in Theme VI that much of the RDC training time was devoted to military drill, above that already devoted by the curriculum to military drill (see Figure 2). It appears to the researcher that an inordinate amount of time is being diverted to military drill when much of the RDC time or military drill time could possibly be used in other areas of training.

Purpose, use and procedures of the Navy "tag out" system was the third discrepancy. The tag out system is the first step in conducting any maintenance function. The person conducting maintenance "tags" the electrical source and the equipment as 'under repair' so others do not inadvertently apply power to that equipment while it is being maintained. Most new sailors will be part of the ship's maintenance team either directly or indirectly. The "tag out" system was designed as a safety system to save lives and should be emphasized at RTC and all schools leading to the fleet.

Because of the physical aspect of being a sailor, RTC should emphasize proper lifting techniques. Fleet sailors in pay grades E-3 and below are normally used for underway replenishment and preparing the ship for deployment. It should be noted that a ship is not always a stable platform for lifting and carrying objects and safety is of grave concern when conducting these activities. Some sailors' daily maintenance routine will

involve lifting objects some considered heavy under at-sea conditions. Strains from lifting objects become a readiness issue. There are posters on the walls of RTC about lifting techniques, but no formal education.

The fifth item: conditions that cause spontaneous combustion, is very important since all sailors live and work in confined areas aboard ship. Aspects that lead to spontaneous combustion should be addressed at RTC and in follow-on schools leading to the fleet. Fire and explosions are a ship's worst enemy.

The sixth area of concern for training at RTC is the shipboard piping identification coding system. This is basic knowledge that all sailors should have before assignment to the fleet. This knowledge is especially helpful to sailors attached to a damage control team and is needed for drills and actual emergencies. It is unclear to the researcher how much, if any, of this information is taught prior to Battle Stations, a damage control simulation conducted on day of training 7-4.

Items seven and eight deal with damage control: identification of damage control lockers and use of contents and methods and procedures for communications in a damage control situation. These areas are covered in brief at RTC to prepare recruits for their final stage of training, Battle Stations. This is a hands-on training experience, however it is the type of training that should be emphasized for shipboard survival.

Items nine through twelve deal with surface preservation. The issue of surface preservation is not covered at RTC and will become a task for many new sailors upon

joining the fleet. Fleet readiness may be enhanced—less training time needed in the fleet—if this topic were addressed at RTC, especially for the GENDET sailors.

Items thirteen and fourteen pertain to professional development. Professional development is taught at RTC, however two areas—purpose of the professional development board and dependent rights, privileges and benefits—are not included in the classroom seminars. It is important for a new sailor to understand what the professional development board is designed for. This may help sailors better understand the performance characteristics expected of them in the fleet.

Another item of concern is that recruits should be informed about their dependents' rights and benefits since a large number of sailors are either single parents, married, or plan to get married soon after RTC graduation.

The last possible discrepancy in training at RTC is about a system that all sailors will use to qualify for various duties. The personnel qualifications standard (PQS) system is used by all sailors in qualifying for watch standing, job qualification, and warfare specialty training. The PQS system is a self-study booklet that guides sailors to subjects that are required knowledge, skills, and abilities that they must be proficient in for their current duty assignment. It is important to understand the workings of the PQS system and how to best use the system for qualification. Many new sailors are handed a PQS book and told, with little guidance, to "go study and come back when you know it." Because all sailors will use this system for qualification, and since it is the main method for most qualifications in the Navy, recruits should be introduced to it at RTC. A new curriculum, now in place at most

advanced schools, Navy Military Training uses the PQS system for sailors to qualify for watch standing and off-base liberty.

Training at Apprentice Training Division (ATD) is two weeks long and covers advanced fire fighting and damage control. ATD teaches GENDETs about damage control lockers, and communications in a damage control situation, however, if recruits attend advanced schooling ("A" school), they do not learn about damage control until they join the fleet.

K. SUMMARY

The first four themes were derived from fleet interviews: (1) lack of commitment/work ethic; (2) lack of pride in ownership; (3) lack of respect for authority; and (4) lack of understanding about teamwork. Based on fleet interviews, the fleet considers these themes as societal issues that RTC should address in their curriculum as part of the transformation process from civilian to sailor.

Theme VII, RTC uses a socialization process in their curriculum, indicates part of the transformation process. RTC attempts to educate recruits on behavioral expectations in the Navy by teaching subject areas such as core values, sexual harassment, fraternization, rape awareness, discrimination, professionalism, and Uniform Code of Military Justice. These are important areas of education in the transformation process and they meet RTC's critical function of developing certain patterns of behavior necessary for shipboard living and maintaining high standards of conduct expected of Navy service.

The societal issues faced by the fleet are not the same societal issues addressed at RTC. There appears to be support for theme VIII. Recruit training is focused on socialization and education based on themes from fleet interviews, the socialization process at RTC, and a comparative analysis between RTC curriculum and NEOCS for pay grade E-2. It appears that RTC does not directly teach responsibility, work ethic, and pride in ownership. However, it appears RTC does attempt to teach teamwork and respect for authority. According to fleet interviews, RTC needs to address work ethic and pride in ownership and needs to improve their curriculum in the areas of teamwork and respect for authority.

Theme VI, RTC spends a large portion of training time on military drill, may be inconsistent with NEOCS requirement 903201 where drill requirements consist of knowing individual positions and facing movements without arms. Up to 56 percent of recruits' training time at RTC may be dedicated to military drill; 23 percent of training time for military drill and 33 percent of training time for RDC training time. This is not to say that all of the RDC training time is spent on military drill, however, according to interviews conducted at RTC, much of the RDC's training time is used for additional military drill. This disparity in skills and knowledge appears to support recruits' perceptions that additional military drill is used for RDC gratification by attempting to win the drill flag.

The political/reactive organizational configuration discussed in theme V may be the underlying cause for the other themes. It appears that RTC reacts quickly to political inquiries and Navy Technical Training Reviews concerning curriculum content. It also

appears that the curriculum at RTC is in a constant state of change with little fleet input. Reacting to influences outside of the organization, and constant change, are characteristic of the political/reactive configuration. This implies that the Commanding Officer might respond to issues of effectiveness at one moment, and efficiency the next in an effort to maintain a balance of mission accomplishment. This appears to be how RTC operates at the time of this study.

Cultural change is difficult. The output from RTC, in the form of graduated recruits, creates a culture that will be imbedded in the fleet. This implies that RTC teaches individuals, (new recruits) who just recently left civilian life, about the Navy, dresses the recruits in the Navy uniform, and sends them to the fleet, without completely transforming their civilian culture to a Navy culture. There are many cultural changes or transformations that occur in recruits while at RTC, but not all recruits transform from civilian to military culture.

In order for an organization's culture to change, the organizational configuration needs to change. However, it is very difficult for an organization to change its configuration. For successful change in configuration, the organization, through the Commanding Officer, must change the organization's direction and/or the design factors of the organization. These steps take a concentrated effort and there must be a champion to the change. The champion to change in the military rests with the Commanding Officer, or change will not occur.

V. SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS

A. SUMMARY

The study examined the gap between training at Recruit Training Command (RTC) and the needs of the fleet based on perceptions and experiences of fleet Division Officers, Chiefs, and General Detail Sailors (GENDETS), RTC personnel and recruits, and the Navy Enlisted Occupational Classification System (NEOCS). Because GENDETS receive the least amount of training (two weeks) between completion of boot camp and joining the fleet, they were used as the target group to assess RTC effectiveness for meeting fleet needs. The gap between training at RTC and the needs of the fleet is apparent from the analysis conducted for this research. RTC concentrates on transforming civilian social norms into Navy social norms. The fleet requires new sailors to work hard, have pride in ownership and self, and respect for authority. NEOCS indicates training deficiencies at RTC in the knowledge base needed for enlisted personnel in pay grade E-2.

All interview participants were asked for their honest perceptions, and all were promised complete anonymity. It is with this understanding of the dynamics involved in questioning all personnel that the following themes emerged.

- **THEME I. FLEET FIRST LIEUTENANT DIVISION OFFICERS AND DIVISION CHIEFS THINK THAT MOST GENDETS LACK COMMITMENT AND A STRONG WORK ETHIC.**
- **THEME II: FLEET FIRST LIEUTENANT DIVISION OFFICERS AND DIVISION CHIEFS FEEL THAT SOME GENDETS LACK PRIDE IN OWNERSHIP.**

- THEME III: FLEET FIRST LIEUTENANT DIVISION OFFICERS AND DIVISION CHIEFS FEEL THAT SOME GENDETS LACK RESPECT TOWARD AUTHORITY.
- THEME IV: FLEET FIRST LIEUTENANT DIVISION OFFICERS AND DIVISION CHIEFS FEEL THAT SOME GENDETS DO NOT UNDERSTAND TEAMWORK.
- THEME V: RTC STAFF WORKS IN A POLITICAL/REACTIVE CONFIGURATION AS AN ORGANIZATION.
- THEME VI: RTC CONCENTRATES A LARGE PORTION OF TRAINING ON MILITARY DRILL.
- THEME VII: RTC IS DESIGNED AS A SOCIALIZATION PROCESS.
- THEME VIII: RTC PREPARES RECRUITS FOR THE FLEET THROUGH SOCIALIZATION AND EDUCATION; THE FLEET WANTS SAILORS THAT FOLLOW ORDERS AND WORK HARD.

These themes are evaluated in terms of perceived views of personnel and recruits at RTC, fleet First Lieutenant Division Officers, Deck Division Chief Petty Officers, and Deck seamen (GENDET sailors). These themes are also analyzed based on comparative analysis of the RTC curriculum and NEOCS.

RTC appears to work on transforming civilian values and ethics into Navy values and ethics; i.e., socialization. This transformational training is conducted in the classroom and is indirectly re-enforced on a daily basis. Recruits are also educated about the Navy, the chain of command, and rights and responsibilities, which is part of the socialization process. Perceptions from fleet sailors interviewed are that RTC is not preparing recruits for service in the fleet or creating disciplined sailors.

B. CONCLUSIONS

RTC's mission is to transform civilians into motivated and disciplined apprentice sailors and to prepare these recruits for follow-on training and service in the fleet. The data collected for this research suggest that RTC does not fully meet its mission with respect to preparing recruits for service in the fleet. This implies that RTC could incorporate different training methodologies to help meet its mission.

Some of the shortfalls in training at RTC may come from the fact that Recruit Division Commanders (RDCs) control 33 percent of recruits' training time, however, this time is not standardized. Some RDCs use this time to teach recruits about the Navy, and some RDCs use this time to prepare recruits for inspections and exams. Constant drilling and studying for exams is perceived by recruits as self-serving for the RDC. RDCs are perceived as self-serving in this regard because the recruits think that winning drill, inspection, and academic honors is for RDC gratification, not for the division. The recruits consider they would rather learn more about the Navy, be physically challenged, and receive hands-on training to better prepare them for duty in the fleet.

The recruits' training desires are echoed in the needs of the fleet. The fleet desires sailors with a strong work ethic, pride in ownership and self, and respect for authority. Fleet input for this study indicates that RTC is failing in these areas of training. Fleet First Lieutenant Division Officers and Chiefs feel that RTC should teach "Navy pride" and work ethic as opposed to concentrating on lowering attrition.

In a sense, the role of RTC is to transform the new recruits' existence in an adaptive organizational configuration to a directive configuration—which amounts to helping them adapt to a new culture. To change a recruit's culture, RTC must give recruits a new direction—mission and values—and a new set of design factors. Design factors (McCaskey, 1979) include new tasks, technology, structure, people, and process/subsystems. RTC teaches new recruits about basic tasks and specifications of actions required in the Navy. This assists in the transformation of civilian culture to military culture. However, some technology, group working structures (other than chain of command), knowledge, skills, abilities, and military processes are not addressed in accordance with NEOCS. These issues must be part of the education, training, and day-to-day life of RTC, while maintaining characteristics, such as innovative thinking, to completely transform civilian culture into a Navy culture.

RTC staff works in a political/reactive configuration. A political/reactive configuration consists of an organization that reacts to politics and is political (Lindblom, 1979). There are competing external environments such as other military services, congresspersons, parents, economy, and civil-military relations. These external pressures drive planning, decision-making and change, such as the desire to keep attrition low, at RTC. There is a very dynamic training plan that is designed for educating recruits, however, planning changes to the curriculum is typically made in response to the external pressures. Curriculum decision-making is responsive to political authority or inquiry, not necessarily to the needs of the fleet. One RDC commented, "The only constant here is change."

Curriculum officers spend a majority of their time making curriculum changes or responding to congressional inquiries. One of the curriculum officers commented they were too busy trying to keep up with curriculum changes and did not have time to look at the actual training needs. Education specialists also spend much of their time ensuring the curriculum guides meet educational specifications required by the Chief of Naval Education and Training (CNET).

RTC appears to have a possible dysfunctional reward system with respect to the RDC Excellence Award Program and the mission of the RDCs. The RDC Creed is, "These recruits are entrusted to my care. I will train them to the best of my ability. I will develop them into smartly disciplined, physically fit, basically trained sailors. I will instill in them, and demonstrate by my own example, the highest standard of honor, courage and commitment" (RDC Training Manual: 1). The difficulty in reaching the milestone of the RDC Excellence Award may taint some RDCs' abilities in training recruits and meeting the RTCs mission by "gaming the system" to gain this award.

E. RECOMMENDATIONS

RTC does an excellent job of instilling most military values into today's young sailor, considering RTC's difficult mission and the many inhibiting factors to success. However, according to the sample of Officers and Chiefs interviewed for this research, RTC's current curriculum is not meeting the needs of the fleet or the readiness goals of the Navy.

Additional research is recommended to gain a better understanding of how to best train young men and women to meet the needs of the fleet. It is possible that a longitudinal study tracking a larger number of GENDETs, with Division Officer and Chiefs' inputs on their performance, would yield more substantial results. Particular emphasis might be placed on specific factors associated with retention and attrition of recruits. Navy personnel who failed to complete their first term of enlistment should be queried as a means to possibly gain additional insights to RTC training and skills required while in the fleet.

The following four recommendations may assist RTC in meeting their mission:

1. Review NEOCS requirements for E-2 as a means to incorporate more hands-on training.

Recruits may learn more skills applicable to the fleet working environment with more hands-on training. Incorporating a hands-on lab that teaches recruits about preventative maintenance and the Navy "tag out" system may also help build a better work ethic, pride in ownership, and team work. This type of hands-on training may assist in the transformation process from civilian to sailor by giving recruits a sense of the Navy's mission and values.

2. All recruits should be put in a leadership role while at RTC.

Another recommendation that might assist in the transformation process is to implement opportunities for hands-on practice in leadership. Requiring a recruit to be responsible for the division in meeting its daily routine and

answering to the RDC for any infractions may build respect toward authority, create an atmosphere of belonging, and enhance teamwork.

3. Standardize some of the RDC training time.

RDC training time composes 33 percent of recruit training. This training time is not standardized for RDCs. Nonstandard training may lead to adhoc training that is not relevant to recruit training or meeting RTC's mission. Some of the RDC training time may be used for hands-on training as suggested in recommendation number one.

4. Review RDC Excellence Award Program

There appears to be a "gaming of the system" by RDCs to receive the RDC Excellence Award. "Gaming" refers to how an RDC may ensure a less than average recruit is not present during an inspection. For example an RDC may ensure recruits, who are poor at marching, have medical or dental appointments on the day of a drill inspection. According to RDC interviews, the difficulty in reaching the milestone of the RDC Excellence Award may cause RDCs to focus less on enhancing the abilities of poor performing recruits. Instead, RDCs concentrate their efforts on ensuring those recruits are not available during inspections. Perhaps this award should be based less on the performance of the recruits and more on the performance of the RDC. Such changes in RDC performance measurement may bring a halt to "gaming the system" and allow those RDCs to concentrate their efforts on transforming civilians into sailors.

RTC is constrained by complex, external influences such as the civil-military gap, recruiting shortfalls, and the needs of the fleet. Because of these external influences, RTC is only partially accomplishing its mission of transforming civilians into motivated and disciplined sailors and preparing recruits for service in the fleet. There appears to be a training gap at RTC in preparing recruits for the fleet as indicated in the above recommendations. To better ensure RTC can accomplish this portion of their mission, they might investigate a process to receive timely and continual fleet feedback. Fleet feedback and an internal study of RTC's political/reactive organizational system design for incorporating curriculum changes may help RTC adjust their training methodologies to "build a better sailor" and enhance fleet readiness.

APPENDIX A. INTERVIEW QUESTIONS

General Questions for RTC

1. What is the percentage of GENDETs that graduate per year/class?
2. What percentage of time is committed to seamanship training?
3. What percentage of time is committed to core value training?
4. What percentage of time is committed to "fleet survival" training?
5. What percentage of time is committed to rights and responsibilities?
6. What percentage of time is committed to the transformation process?
7. What is the most important area of training?
8. How much free time is allowed per week/day?
9. What is the percentage of time spent in the classroom?
10. What training is conducted on the weekends?

RTC Curriculum Officer Questions

Background:

Warfare Designator:

Education:

YOS:

Time at RTC:

1. What is the main focus of RTC training?
2. How many curriculums do you control?
3. How many changes have there been in your curriculum over the past 10 years?
4. What changes have been made?
5. Why were changes made?
6. How are core values instilled in the recruits?
7. What basic skills should a recruit graduate with?
8. How much time is spent on learning Navy culture and how is it conducted?
9. How has classroom training changed over the past 10 years?
10. Why have changes occurred?
11. How is the transformation process conducted?
12. What feedback do you receive from the fleet?
13. How do you receive the feedback?
14. Are changes made to the curriculum based on the feedback?
15. Who makes the changes to the curriculum?

16. What feedback do you receive from the recruits?
17. How prepared are recruits for follow-on training?
18. What would you like to add that you feel I should know to help me with my thesis?

RDC Questions

Background:

Rating: YOS: Number of courses taught:

Previous duty station(s): Bootcamp experience:

1. How much freedom do you have to discipline recruits?
2. What are areas of discipline?
3. How much physical training is conducted?
4. How much training is dedicated to seamanship?
5. How much time is dedicated to the transformation process? (Learning Navy and military culture/decivilianizing/role-depossessing)
6. How much time is dedicated to understanding and living out Navy core values?
7. How long does it take for recruits to internalize Navy core values during bootcamp?
8. How long does it take for the transformation process to occur?
9. How much time is dedicated to Navy traditions and customs?
10. What feedback do you receive from the fleet?
11. How do you receive fleet feedback?
12. How much input do you have toward curriculum changes?
13. How many free hours do the recruits have per day without instructor contact?
14. How would you improve the RTC experience/training/education/indoctrination process to better meet fleet requirements?
15. What are the most important skills a new recruit needs to learn before graduation?

16. What would you like to add that you feel I should know to help me with my thesis?

RTC Instructor Questions

Background:

Rating: YOS: Number of courses taught:

Previous duty station(s): Bootcamp experience:

1. How much freedom do you have to discipline recruits?
2. What are areas of discipline?
3. How are classroom sessions conducted?
4. Do recruits have a chance to study the content before class?
5. How much freedom do you have for personalizing Instructor Guides?
6. How many written tests are there? Is there one for each subject?
7. How much freedom do you have for sea-stories?
8. Do you feel the recruits learn enough in the classroom to be successful in the fleet?
9. How many multi-mediums do you use?
10. How much freedom do you have away from the I.G.?
11. How is the communication flow in the classroom?
12. How did Instructor School prepare you for this level of training?
13. Explain the Instructor under training process.
14. How many students do you instruct at one time? (On average)
15. What would you like to add that you feel I should know to help me with my thesis?

GENDET/ATD Student Control Officer Questions

Background:

YOS	Rank	Job	Time onboard	Type ship
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1. How much time is devoted to re-enforcing core values, customs and traditions for GENDET sailors at this command?
2. How much hold time is there for a GENDET during their 3 weeks of training?
3. How much military interaction is there during training for GENDETS?
4. How much GMT is there during a GENDET's time at ATD?
5. How are core values, customs and traditions exhibited in the fleet?
6. How important are Navy customs and traditions in this command?
7. What traditions, learned in bootcamp, are least important in this command?
8. How are core values, customs and traditions re-enforced in this command?
9. How much influence does the CO have in shaping culture and core values in this command?

Academics – individuals are carefully moved through training programs for career development

Fortresses – individuals are asked to engage in a turnaround and a fight for survival.

Clubs – seniority, loyalty, status, commitment, and "fitting in" are most important

Baseball Team – talent and performance are considered critical.

SWO/CHIEF Interview Questions

Background:

YOS	Time Onboard	Ship type	Job	Rank
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1. How much influence does the CO have in shaping culture and core values in this command?

Academic – Individuals are carefully moved through training programs for career development.

Fortress – Individuals are asked to engage in a turnaround and a fight for survival

Club – seniority, loyalty, status, commitment, and “fitting in” are most important

Baseball Team – talent and performance are considered critical.

2. How are core values exhibited in the fleet?

3. How important are Navy customs and traditions in this command (fleet)?

4. What customs and traditions are least important?

5. Does today’s GENDET sailor meet fleet expectations in the area of core values, customs and traditions, if so, what are those expectations?

6. How are core values, customs and traditions re-enforced in this command (fleet)?

7. What customs and traditions are most important for a new sailor to internalize?

8. Is there anything you think I should know to assist me with my thesis?

**APPENDIX B. E-2 REQUIREMENTS FROM THE MANUAL OF NAVY
ENLISTED MANPOWER AND PERSONNEL CLASSIFICATION AND
OCCUPATIONAL STANDARDS**

900 MILITARY REQUIREMENTS

901 WATCH, QUARTER AND STATION BILL

901201 PURPOSE AND CONTENT OF WATCH, QUARTER AND STATION BILL

902 SEAMANSHIP

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